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Property and Speech
Robert A. Sedler*

I. INTRODUCTION

This Article analyzes the impact of the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech on the use, enjoyment and control of
property. The Article analyzes this impact with reference to "The
First Amendment as Sword" and "The First Amendment as Shield."
In "The First Amendment as Sword," the Article discusses how
the First Amendment has been asserted to interfere with a property
owner's use or control of tangible property and to limit the protection
of an owner's property interests. The following areas will be covered:
(1) Picketing and Protests; (2) Boycotts; (3) Governmental Economic
Regulation; (4) Home Solicitation; (5) "Fair Use" and Copyright
Protection; and (6) Access to Public Property.
In "The First Amendment as Shield," the Article discusses how
the First Amendment has been asserted to invalidate or limit
otherwise permissible government regulation of property ownership
or use by enterprises engaged in the "business of expression." The
following areas will be covered: (1) Regulation of Sexually-Oriented
Entertainment; (2) Licensing of the Business of Expression; (3)
Billboard and Sign Regulation; (4) Illegal Conduct and the Business
of Expression; (5) Regulation of Newspapers and Publishers; and (6)
Regulation of Broadcasting, Cable and the Internet.
The Article concludes, not surprisingly, that the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression has a very
significant impact on the use, enjoyment and control of property. The
First Amendment operates as a sword to enable persons engaged in
expressive activity to interfere with an owner's use or control of
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B. (1956); J.D. (1959),
University of Pittsburgh.
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tangible property and to avoid liability for interference with an
owner's property interests. The First Amendment also operates as a
shield to invalidate or limit otherwise permissible regulation of
property use and business operations by enterprises engaged in the
"business of expression."
This result should not be surprising in light of the function of the
First Amendment in the American constitutional system. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of expression very expansively, and the constitutional
protection afforded to freedom of expression is perhaps the strongest
afforded to any individual right under the Constitution. It is also fair
to say that the constitutional protection afforded to freedom of
expression in the United States is seemingly unparalleled by other
constitutional systems, and that, as a constitutional matter, the value
of freedom of expression prevails over other democratic values, such
as equality and privacy. 1
The strong constitutional protection afforded to freedom of
expression is reflected in what this Article calls "the law of the First
Amendment.",2 The "law of the First Amendment" consists, in large
part, of concepts, principles and specific doctrines that the Supreme
Court has developed over the years in the process of deciding First
Amendment cases. These concepts, principles, and doctrines are
supplemented by a residual balancing approach, which, to a degree,
consists of subsidiary doctrines that have resulted from the Court's
precedents dealing with particular kinds of interferences with
freedom of expression. The components of the "law of the First
1. Similarly, the First Amendment provides greater protection to freedom of expression
than is generally provided under international human rights norms. For example, Article 20 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires that "[a]ny propaganda for
war" and "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence" be "prohibited by law." See International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 20, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976). Because "war propaganda" and "hate
speech" are, in most circumstances, protected by the First Amendment, when the Senate ratified
the ICCPR, the resolution of ratification contained a reservation to the effect that "Article 20
does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict
the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United
States." 138 CONG. REC. § 4781-01 (1992).
2. See generally Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment in Litigation: The "Lav of the
FirstAmendment," 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 457 (1991).
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Amendment," then, are concepts, principles, specific doctrines, and
what may be called "balancing/subsidiary doctrines."
In practice, the constitutional protection of freedom of expression
is very much a matter of identification and application. In many
cases, once the appropriate concept, principle, specific doctrine or
"balancing/subsidiary" doctrine has been identified and applied, the
parameters for the resolution of the First Amendment issue are
established and the result is often fairly clear. To this extent, the "law
of the First Amendment" may be considered settled. While a large
number of First Amendment cases arise in practice and some come
cases will be resolved
before the Supreme Court every term, these
3
Amendment.",
First
the
of
"law
the
under
The development of the "law of the First Amendment" and its
application to questions of property and speech has continued on the
same course throughout the years of the Rehnquist Court. It is this
Article's submission that, in the area of the First Amendment, the socalled "liberal-conservative" divisions that may appear in other areas
are generally absent. The Court as an institution has demonstrated a
strong commitment to the constitutional protection of freedom of
expression. The differences that may appear among members of the
Court in First Amendment cases are generally non-ideological, and
usually involve simply a disagreement over the application of the
"law of the First Amendment" to specific situations. With this
introduction, the Article now turns to "The First Amendment as
Sword" and "The First Amendment as Shield."
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS SWORD
Here we will discuss how the First Amendment has been asserted
by those engaged in expressive activities to interfere with a property
owner's use or control of tangible property and to limit the protection
of the owner's property interests.
3. For an update of the "Law of the First Amendment," see Robert A. Sedler, The Settled
Nature of American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 173, 283-325
(2002).

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 21:123

A. Picketing and Protests
It has long been recognized that picketing is a form of protected
speech under the First Amendment.4 Public streets and sidewalks in
front of a home or place of business are public forums. The First
Amendment guarantees access to a public forum for purposes of

expression, and a state can regulate such access only by contentneutral and reasonable time, place and manner limitations. 5 In order
for a particular regulation to be sustained as a reasonable time, place

and manner regulation, it must serve a significant governmental
interest and it must leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. 6 This means that, as a general proposition, protestors
have a First Amendment right to interfere with a person's use and
enjoyment of property by picketing and protesting in front of his or
her home or business. Early cases involved protests against racial
discrimination, such as picketing in front of the home of a city mayor
to protest school segregation, 7 and distribution of leaflets accusing a
real estate broker of engaging in "blockbusting." 8 More recent cases
involved protests against abortion, such as picketing in front of the
home of a doctor who performs abortions 9 or protesting in front of

4. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). The early cases involved picketing in
connection with a labor dispute, and the scope of permissible labor picketing is governed by
federal and state labor relations law.
5. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
6. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
7. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
8. See Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
9. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). In Frisby, in response to picketing by antiabortion protestors in front of the home of a doctor who performed abortions, a city enacted an
ordinance that, by its terms, prohibited "engag[ing] in picketing before or about the residence or
dwelling of any individual." Id.at 474. The Court gave the law a narrow construction, so as to
be limited to "focused picketing" directed at a particular residence. Id. As narrowed, the law did
not reach walking through residential neighborhoods or even walking a route in front of an
entire block of houses. Thus, the law advanced the asserted interest in promoting residential
privacy without substantially interfering with the protestors' ability to convey their message to
the general public and to the doctor who was the target of their protest, and therefore could be
upheld as a reasonable time, place and manner limitation.
In Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994), the Court held an injunction
creating a 300-foot buffer zone around the homes of persons who worked in an abortion clinic
to be violative of the First Amendment. The Court noted that the zone surrounding the
residences was much larger than that approved in Frisby, and that a limitation on the time and
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abortion clinics. In these cases, the First Amendment issue was
whether a particular restriction on the protests could be upheld as a
reasonable time, place and manner limitation. The Court held
unconstitutional an injunction ordering anti-abortion protestors to
refrain from attempting to "counsel women entering abortion clinics
who indicated that they did not wish to be 'counseled."'' 10 It upheld
provisions of an injunction establishing a thirty-six-foot buffer zone
around the entrances to an abortion clinic, but struck down provisions
prohibiting anti-abortion protestors from making uninvited
approaches to women seeking to enter the clinic and from displaying
"observable images" of aborted fetuses and the like. " In its latest
pronouncement on the subject, the Court upheld a state law
prohibiting anti-abortion protestors within 100 feet of an abortion
clinic from coming within eight feet of a person going to the clinic
without that person's consent to persuade her not to have an
abortion. 12
It should be emphasized that interference by picketing and
protests with the use and enjoyment of property is possible only
because the picketing and protests take place on adjacent public
streets and sidewalks. Because the adjacent public streets and
sidewalks constitute a public forum for First Amendment purposes,
the picketers and protestors have a right of access therein, and the
state can restrict the picketing and protests only by reasonable time,
place and manner limitations. However, the picketing and protests
would lose their First Amendment protection if they carried over onto
privately owned property because the protestors would then be
engaging in an illegal trespass, and conduct that is otherwise illegal
does not become any less so when it is carried on for purposes of
expression. 3
duration of picketing and on the number of pickets outside a smaller zone would advance the
asserted interest in protecting residential privacy. Id.at 775.
10. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
11.

Madsen, 512 U.S. 753.

12.
13.

Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 21:123

B. Boycotts

The First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association
protects the right to organize boycotts of businesses and products to
advance political objectives. 14 A boycott directly interferes with
property rights by urging people to refrain from dealing with
businesses that are the target of the boycott and to refrain from
purchasing the boycotted products. State tort laws impose liability for
wrongful interference with business interests, but those engaged in
boycotts to achieve political objectives have successfully asserted the
First Amendment as a bar to the imposition of liability under these
laws. The leading case on this issue is NAACP v. Claiborne
HardwareCo.15 In 1966, African-American residents of a Mississippi
city, led by the NAACP, organized a boycott of white-owned
businesses in the city as a means of pressuring the businesses to hire
African-American employees and the city and county governments to
take actions such as desegregating the public schools and public
facilities, hiring African-American police officers, making
improvements in African-American residential areas, selecting
African-Americans for jury duty, and ending the abusive treatment of
African-Americans by police officers and government officials. 16
Although some incidents of violence took place in connection with
the boycott, the boycott was, for the most part, peaceful, and it took
the form of speeches and non-violent picketing urging AfricanAmerican residents not to patronize the boycotted businesses. 7 The
state supreme court imposed liability against the NAACP for all
losses to the businesses caused by the boycott and enjoined the
boycott's continuation. 18
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 19 It held that the First
Amendment precluded the state from imposing liability for the
boycott, except as to specific harm proven to have been caused by
14. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
15. Id.

16. Id. at 898-900.
17. Id. at 903.
18. Id. at 894-96.
19.

Id. at 934.
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acts of violence. 20 The Court noted that "[t]he black citizens named
as defendants in this action banded together and collectively
expressed their dissatisfaction with a social structure that had denied
them rights to equal treatment and respect, ' 2' and that, "'the practice
of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a
common end is deeply embedded in the American political
process.' 22 The First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
association, said the Court, protects "'the right of the people to make
their voices heard on public issues,"' 23 and "[e]ffective advocacy of
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association., 24 The Court
concluded that "[t]he right of the States to regulate economic activity
could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent,
politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and
economic change 25and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the
Constitution itself."
The effect of Claiborne Hardware was to fully legitimatize and
protect the use of the boycott to achieve political objectives despite
its interference with the property rights of the targets of the boycott.
This means that the Southern Baptist Convention can organize a
boycott of Walt Disney theme parks to protest the company's policy
of providing benefits to same-sex partners of employees.2 6 This also
means that groups can organize boycotts against the sponsors of
television programs that feature sex and violence, or against the
products of American companies that are produced abroad under
substandard labor conditions.
20. Id. at 933-34.
21. Id.at907.

22. Id.(quoting Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294
(1981)).
23. Id.
at 908.
24. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
25. Id. at 914.
26. The boycott began in 1997 and was joined by other conservative Christian groups. See
Lori Sham, Southern Baptists May Boycott Disney, USA TODAY, June 16, 1997, at 9A. It ended
in 2005, with the Southern Baptist Convention saying that "[t]he boycott has communicated
effectively our displeasure concerning products and policies that violate moral righteousness
and traditional family values." Baptists End Disney Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at A17.
Disney did not change its policy, and the boycott did not appear to have a significant financial
impact on Disney's operations.
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C. Governmental Economic Regulation
The First Amendment also has some impact on governmental
economic regulation, in that regulatory statutes have been construed
by the Court to not reach certain expressive activities. While
Congress may prohibit secondary boycotts by labor unions as part of
its "striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of
expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and
consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial
strife, ' 27 this prohibition has been construed to not prohibit the
picketing of a secondary employer that is confined to persuading28
customers to cease buying the product of the primary employer.
Similarly, under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,29 there is immunity
from antitrust liability for concerted efforts to restrain or monopolize
trade by utilizing the First Amendment's right of petition for redress
of grievances. In Noerr, an association of railroads engaged a public
relations firm to conduct a publicity campaign against the trucking
industry, which, according to the antitrust complaint of the truckers,
was "designed to foster the adoption and retention of laws and law
enforcement practices destructive of the trucking business, to create
an atmosphere of distaste for the truckers among the general public,
and to impair the relationships existing between the truckers and their
customers., 30 The truckers alleged that the sole motive for the
campaign "was the desire on the part of the railroads to injure the
27. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees
Union, 447 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
result)).
28. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58 (1964). It should
also be noted that section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(2000), does not by its terms prohibit "publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public ... that a product or products are produced by an employer with
whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer."
But see Retail Store, 447 U.S. at 617-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
result). In Retail Store, the Court held that the prohibition on secondary boycotts does extend to
a union's picketing of title companies that sold the insurance policies of the insurance
underwriter with whom the union had a labor dispute. Id. The Court concluded that because the
title companies derived much of their revenue from the sale of the underwriter's policies, the
effect of the picketing could amount to a boycott of the title companies themselves. Id.
29. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
30. Noerr Motor, 365 U.S. at 129.
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truckers and eventually to destroy them as competitors in the longdistance freight business., 3' The complaint also alleged specific
instances in which the railroads attempted to influence legislation by
means of their publicity campaign, for example, that they persuaded
the Governor of Pennsylvania to veto a law that would have
32
permitted truckers to carry heavier loads over Pennsylvania roads.
The Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to the
activities of the railroads.33 The Court noted that the Sherman Act
does not apply to state action, and therefore it also should not prohibit
"two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to
persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action with
respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly., 34 The
Court went on to discuss the importance of the constitutional right to
petition, stating that "[i]n a representative democracy such as this,
these branches of government act on behalf of the people and, to a
very large extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon
the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their
representatives." 35
Concluding that "[t]he right of petition is one of the freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly
impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms," the Court
held that the Sherman Act did not apply to the activities of the
railroads, insofar as they comprised the "mere solicitation of
governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of
laws.", 36 Moreover, it did not matter that the sole purpose for the
railroad's exercise of the right of petition was to destroy the truckers
as competitors for the long-distance freight business, or that the
railroads made it appear that its propaganda was being circulated by
independent groups. The Court noted:
Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in
legislating with respect to problems relating to the conduct of

31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 145.

34. Id. at 136.
35.

Id. at 137.

36. Id. at 138.
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political activities, a caution which has been reflected in the
decisions of this Court interpreting such legislation. All of this
caution would go for naught if we permitted an extension of
the Sherman Act to regulate activities of that nature simply
because those activities have a commercial impact and involve
conduct that can be termed unethical.3 7
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine also immunizes concerted action
to institute legal and administrative proceedings from antitrust
liability. 38 The Court has made it clear that its interpretation of the
antitrust laws to provide immunity for the exercise of the right of
association and petition was influenced by First Amendment
concerns, and, as a result, it has been unnecessary for the Court to
39
decide whether this result is required by the First Amendment itself.

37. Id. at 141.
38. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). The Court stated:
We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and petition to hold
that groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use
the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their
causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and economic
interests vis-A-vis their competitors.
Id. at 510-11.
There is a "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In Noerr Motor, the Court
stated that "[t]here may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application
of the Sherman Act would be justified." Noerr Motor, 365 U.S. at 144. In California Motor
Transport, the Court held that the plaintiff had alleged facts that, if true, would come within the
"sham" exception, such as that the defendants acted "to harass and deter [the plaintiffs] in their
use of administrative and judicial proceedings, so as to deny them 'free and unlimited access' to
those tribunals." CaliforniaMotor, 404 U.S. at 511, 516. In ProfessionalReal Estate Investors,
Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, the Court held that, with respect to litigation, the "sham"
exception applied only if the litigation was "objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits," and if the baseless lawsuit concealed
"an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor" through "'the
use [of] the governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that process."' 508 U.S. 49,
60-61 (1993) (citations omitted).
39. In ClaiborneHardware,the Court discussed the First Amendment concerns expressed
in Noerr Motor and noted that, like the railroads in Noerr Motor, the organizers of the boycott
in ClaiborneHardwaredirectly intended that the merchants would sustain economic injury as a
result of the boycott. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982). It then pointed
out that, unlike the railroads in Noerr Motor, the purpose of the boycott in ClaiborneHardware
was not to destroy legitimate competition, but to "vindicate rights of equality and freedom that
lie at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment itself." Id. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial
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D. Home Solicitation

The First Amendment cannot, however, be used as a sword to
force access to peoples' homes for purposes of expression. In
addition to the property right of homeowners to exclude unwelcome
entrants, persons also have a First Amendment right not to receive
unwanted information in the privacy of their homes. 40 However, so
long as the homeowner has not acted affirmatively to exclude the
Lawyers Ass 'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990), the Court held that antitrust immunity did not extend to an
agreement among District of Columbia lawyers representing indigent defendants to refuse to
accept new appointments unless the District enacted legislation increasing their compensation.
The Court held that this was a classic agreement in restraint of trade among competitors, and
that, unlike Noerr Motor, in which the restraint of trade was the intended consequence of the
public action, here the boycott was the means by which the lawyers sought to obtain favorable
legislation. Id. at 424-25. It also rejected the lawyers' argument, in reliance on Claiborne
Hardware, that their boycott was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 427 n.10. The
Claiborne Hardware boycott was designed to advance political objectives for the AfricanAmerican residents of the city, while the boycott here was designed to obtain financial benefit
for the lawyers by a "lessening of competition in the "boycotted market." Id. at 427 (quoting
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 508 (1988)). Because the
boycott here had the economic objective to benefit the participants in the market, rather than the
political objective recognized in Claiborne Hardware, the Court held that it was not entitled to
First Amendment protection.
40. Thus, a homeowner has the "power to decide 'whether distributors of literature may
lawfully call it a home,"' Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943), and Congress
may protect homeowner privacy by establishing a "do not receive" list of homeowners who do
not want to receive advertisements for "sexually provocative" material and require mailers to
remove their names from mailing lists. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736
(1970); see also Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 812 (2004) (upholding against First Amendment challenge the national "do
not call" registry, which allows individuals to register their phone numbers so that most
commercial telemarketers are prohibited from calling them). The Mainstream court rejected the
claim that the law violated First Amendment content neutrality because it did not include
charitable and political calls in the registry. Id.
Because the media enjoy no greater First Amendment rights than the public at large and
cannot claim exemption from laws of general application on the ground that they are engaged in
the business of newsgathering, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), the court
held ABC news liable for the torts of breach of loyalty and trespass when two reporters gained
access as employees to a food market and videotaped unwholesome food practices. Food Lion,
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999). However, ABC could not
be held liable for harm caused to the food market by the videotape in the absence of a showing
of "malice" under the New York Times standard. Id at 523-24.
In Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999), the Court held that police officers violated
the Fourth Amendment right of the person whose home was searched when they brought
newspaper reporters with them to videotape and report the event. The Fourth Amendment
violation was not obviated by the defendants' invocation of the First Amendment to justify their
actions. Id. at 612-13.
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particular solicitor, or solicitors in general, from approaching the
home, the First Amendment can be used to effectively challenge
government efforts to restrict or deny such access in the name of
protecting homeowner privacy. Indeed, it is precisely because the
homeowner has the right to exclude unwelcome entrants that there
almost always will be "less intrusive and more effective measures to
protect privacy. ' '4 1 These laws sometimes take the form of
prohibitions and sometimes of notice or permit requirements, but,
beginning with cases brought in the 1940s by Jehovah's Witnesses,
whose religion mandates door-to-door canvassing to preach the
gospel,4 2 the Court has invariably held that they are unconstitutional
as applied to religious, political, and charitable speech and
solicitation.4 3 An earlier case, decided before the Court held that
44
commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection,
upheld a ban on commercial solicitation without advance homeowner
consent against First Amendment challenge. If such a case arose
today, it would be decided in accordance with the commercial speech
doctrine, and would likely be invalidated as restricting commercial

41. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980).
42. See Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 161
(2002).
43. The most recent case was Watchtower Bible, in which the Court invalidated an
ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit (given to all who requested it) prior to
engaging in door-to-door advocacy and to display on demand the permit containing the
individual's name. Id. The Court held that the law was not narrowly tailored to advancing the
asserted interests in protecting homeowner privacy and preventing fraud. ld. at 168; see also
Citizensfor a Better Env 't, 444 U.S. 620 (considering solicitation permits that were required for
charitable organizations and given only to those that used at least 75% of their receipts for
charitable purposes); Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (considering
an identification permit for canvassing or soliciting from house to house); City ofStruthers, 319
U.S. 141 (considering a ban on door-to-door distribution of handbills, circulars or other
advertisements); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (considering a permit requirement for
canvassing, soliciting or distributing circulars from house to house).
While a restriction on hours of solicitation could be sustained as a reasonable time, place
and manner limitation, courts have generally held that the particular restriction does not satisfy
this test. See, e.g., N.J. Citizen Action v. Edison Twp., 797 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1986); City of
Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1986), affd, 479 U.S. 1048
(1987); ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1983).
44. The inclusion of commercial speech within the protection of the First Amendment was
first recognized in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
45. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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speech more extensively than necessary to advance the asserted
interest in protecting homeowner privacy.46
E. "FairUse" and Copyright Protection
First Amendment considerations are incorporated into federal
copyright law, and to this extent the First Amendment limits the
copyright owner's ability to use and control his or her copyright. The
incorporation of First Amendment considerations into copyright law
is accomplished by provisions of the Copyright Act that prevent the
copyrighting of ideas or facts 47 and that provide the "fair use"
defense, which enables copyrighted works to be reproduced "for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ...
scholarship, or research., 48 The Court also noted that the Framers
intended copyright to be an engine of free expression in that, by
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression,
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate
ideas, and that to allow an owner to copyright a work protects the
owner's right to refrain from speaking. 49 Thus, the Court took the
position that, in the context of copyright protection, First Amendment
concerns are adequately addressed by the built-in safeguards of the
Copyright Act. 50 Further, the Court has not seen it necessary to go
beyond the built-in safeguards, such as by recognizing a "public
figure exception to copyright protection" 5' or by holding that the First
46. See Project 80's, Inc. v. City of Pocatello, 876 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying the
commercial speech doctrine to invalidate a ban on door-to-door commercial solicitation).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003); Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 549-55. The fair use exception has been broadly interpreted, as illustrated
by Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001), in which the court
applied the exception to hold that the copyright of GONE WITH THE WIND was not infringed by
THE WIND DONE GONE, which effectively rewrote the book in the form of a parody designed to
"rebut and destroy the perspective, judgments, and mythology" of GONE WITH THE WIND. Id. at
1270.
49. See Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 558-60.
50. Eldred,537 U.S. at 221.
51. See Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (stating that "we see no warrant for expanding the
doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright").
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extending twenty more years of
Amendment prevents Congress from
52
protection to existing copyrights.
F. Access to Public Property
"The First Amendment as Sword" is the basis for finding a right
of access to public property that is not a public forum for purposes of
expression. 53 Under the Court's public forum doctrine, when public
property is a traditional54 or designated public forum,55 the public has
a right of access to that forum, and its use of the forum can be
regulated only by reasonable and content-neutral time, place and
manner regulations. 56 Most public property, however, is not a public
forum, and the government frequently wishes to restrict access to that
property by persons seeking to use it for purposes of expression. The
Court held that the First Amendment provides some protection for
expression that takes place on or seeks access to government property
that is not a public forum. 57 The constitutionality of restrictions on
the use or access to such property is determined by a general
reasonableness test, which recognizes the government's entitlement
to "reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise. 5 8 This means that, although the government cannot
impose viewpoint-based restrictions on access to government
52. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-217 (dismissing arguments that Congress does not have
the power to extend copyright protection by twenty years).
53. What this means is that the First Amendment is relied on to challenge laws or
governmental actions that deny or restrict access to such property. See, e.g., Bd. of Airport
Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (holding unconstitutional an absolute ban
against "all First Amendment activities" at an airport terminal without regard to whether the
terminal constituted a public forum).
54. Public streets and parks are a traditional public forum. Hague v. Comm. for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
55. A designated public forum is one that has been established by the government for
purposes of expression, but the government may take away that designation. The designated
public forum may be created for a limited purpose, such as for use by certain groups. See
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1981); City of Madison v. Wis. Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174-77 (1976).
56. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648-50
(1981).
57. See supra note 53.
58. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
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property, 59 it can impose category-based restrictions so long as they
are reasonably related to the purpose for which the property is being
used. 60 Applying this standard, the Court held that a school district
may limit access to the interschool mail system to the exclusive
bargaining representative of its teachers, 6 ' that the military may
exclude all partisan political activity from military bases,62 and that
the federal government may exclude legal defense and political
advocacy groups from a charity drive aimed at federal employees and
conducted in a federal workplace during working hours. 63

Once we move beyond these category-based restrictions on access
to certain kinds of government property, the government must justify
further restrictions as necessary to reserve the property for its
intended purposes, and therefore must demonstrate that the particular
expressive activity seeking access to the property is "basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time.",64 This means that, except for permissible categorybased restrictions, the government may not declare the non-public
forum entirely "off limits" to expression, but may impose reasonable
restrictions related to preventing interference with the "normal
activity of a particular place at a particular time.", 65 For example, a
state could prohibit making a speech in the reading room of a public
library, but could not prohibit a silent vigil in which persons sat on

59. There are two aspects to the very important First Amendment principle of content
neutrality: viewpoint neutrality and category neutrality. Under the viewpoint neutrality aspect,
the government cannot regulate expression in such a way as to favor one viewpoint over
another. Under the category neutrality aspect, the government cannot regulate in such a way as
to differentiate between categories of expression. While the Court has recognized no exceptions
whatsoever to the viewpoint neutrality aspect, it has allowed some limited exceptions to the
category neutrality aspect. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 466-70.
60. See infra notes 61-63 (this is the holding of these three cases).
61. Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
62. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
63. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
64. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
65. Id. at 116, 118. In Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), the Court held that the
state could bar demonstrations in front of a jail and strongly indicated that the state could
declare the jail off-limits for all expression. Id. at 47-48. In Grayned,the Court noted that the
holding in Adderley was that "demonstrators could be barred from jailhouse grounds not
ordinarily open to the public, at least where the demonstration obstructed the jail driveway and
interfered with the functioning of the jail." 408 U.S. at 121 n.49.
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the floor of the reading room to protest the government's policies.6 6
Likewise, a city could prohibit a demonstration on school grounds
while school is in session, but not after the school day has ended.67
On the other hand, the Court held that a city may prohibit the posting
of signs on city property, such as utility poles and lamp posts, to
prevent "visual clutter," 68 and that the military may generally prohibit
protest activity at military bases.6 9
An expressive activity is most likely to be permissible in a nonpublic forum that is physically open, such as an airport terminal. The
Court held unconstitutional an absolute ban against "all First
Amendment activities" at an airport terminal 7° and a ban on the
distribution of literature in an airport terminal, 71 but upheld a ban on
the solicitation and receipt of funds in the terminal.7 2
66. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 147-49 (1966) (holding that the government
could not prohibit a silent "sit-in" at a public library to protest its policy of racial segregation).
67. In Grayned, the Court upheld an anti-noise ordinance that applied only while school
was in session and that prohibited the "making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends
to disturb the peace or good order of such school session." 408 U.S. at 108.
68. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816-17 (1984).
The Court has held that the Postal Service may prohibit the deposit of unstamped materials in
letterboxes to ensure that only material on which postage has been paid can be deposited in
letterboxes. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 126-28
(1981).
69. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
70. Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 570, 577 (1987).
71. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
72. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683-85 (1992).
Where the non-public forum is physically open, such as an airport terminal, the Court's
application of the general reasonableness test to the non-public forum does not differ
significantly from its application of the reasonable time, place, and manner doctrine to the
public forum. In this case, four Justices held that the interior area of an airport terminal outside
of the passenger security zones was a public forum for purposes of the public forum doctrine,
and that neither the ban on distribution of literature nor the ban on solicitation and receipt of
funds could be sustained as a reasonable time, place and manner regulation. Id. at 693, 704
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, whose vote provided the fifth vote on all of the
issues in the case, held that the interior area of an airport terminal did not constitute a public
forum, and, applying the general reasonableness test, concluded that the ban on distribution was
not reasonable, but that the ban on solicitation and receipt of funds was. Id. at 685-87, 689, 690
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy, one of the four Justices who held that the interior
area of the airport terminal outside of the passenger security zones was a public forum, upheld
the ban on solicitation and receipt as a reasonable time, place and manner limitation. Id. at 704
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
Similarly, in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990), the Court upheld the Postal
Service's ban on solicitation on postal premises, as applied to a sidewalk near the entrance of a
postal building. Id. at 733, 735, 737. Four Justices held that the postal sidewalk was not a public
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The Court, applying a general reasonableness test, has held that, in
certain circumstances, the First Amendment protects the right of
access to government property that is not a public forum for purposes
of expression. Unlike private property owners, the government does
not have full control over its own property, and can only impose
reasonable restrictions on access of expressive activity to a nonpublic forum.
This portion of the Article has discussed the operation of "The
First Amendment as Sword." It demonstrates how the First
Amendment has been asserted to interfere with a property owner's
use or control of tangible property and to limit the protection of an
owner's property interest. The fact that the First Amendment can be
used to significantly interfere with property rights in this manner
illustrates the strong constitutional protection afforded to freedom of
expression in the American constitutional system.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS SHIELD

We will now discuss how the First Amendment has been asserted
to invalidate or limit otherwise permissible governmental regulation
of property ownership or use by enterprises engaged in the "business
of expression." The use of the "First Amendment as Shield" arises
primarily when the government enacts laws that specifically regulate
enterprises engaged in the business of expression or the expressive
activity carried on by those businesses. For the most part, enterprises
engaged in the business of expression cannot claim exemption from
neutral and generally applicable laws, e.g., a theater owner could not
assert a First Amendment right to build a theater in an area zoned as
residential. However, the use of the "First Amendment as Shield"
may also arise when neutral and generally applicable laws are
directly applied to expressive activity in such a way as to interfere
with the activity itself, e.g., the application of a public nudity law to
prohibit players from appearing nude in theatrical productions.
forum, and that the ban on solicitation could be sustained under the general reasonableness test.
Id. at 737. A fifth Justice held that the postal sidewalk was a public forum, but concluded that
the ban on solicitation could be sustained as a reasonable time, place and manner limitation. Id.
at 737-38 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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A. Regulation of Sexually-OrientedEntertainment
There are a number of cases involving the constitutional
permissibility of governmental efforts to regulate sexually-oriented
entertainment. This should not be surprising. The commercial sex
industry consists of many businesses featuring sexually-oriented
entertainment-"adult bookstores," "adult theaters," "strip clubs,"
and the like, and other businesses such as massage parlors, "escort
services," and street prostitution. But while there are few legal
restraints on the government's ability to prohibit or extensively
regulate other parts of the commercial sex industry, the First
Amendment comes into play when the government acts against the
"sexually-oriented entertainment" part of the industry. Apart from
anything else, the First Amendment means that the government
cannot absolutely prohibit "sexually-oriented entertainment," "nude
dancing," or other forms of expression conveying a message of
sexuality.73 As a constitutional matter, the government can only
regulate "sexually-oriented entertainment," and it must do so within
the constraints of the First Amendment. At the same time, the Court
has held that the First Amendment permits the government to deal
with the undesirable secondary effects associated with sexuallyoriented entertainment, so that a state may treat sexually-oriented
entertainment differently than other types of entertainment by
imposing regulations directed toward its undesirable secondary
effects. 4
The Court has held that, because of the undesirable secondary
effects associated with the operation of sexually-oriented
entertainment businesses, such as neighborhood deterioration and an
increased risk of crime, municipalities may enact special zoning
regulations for sexually-oriented entertainment. These regulations

73. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-68 (1991) (holding that nude erotic dancing, including striptease
dancing, is expressive conduct within the protection of the First Amendment, although only at
the outer limits); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (holding that a ban

on all live entertainment inside an area zoned commercial violates the First Amendment).
74. As a result, restrictions on sexually-oriented entertainment are evaluated under the
intermediate standard of scrutiny applicable to time, place and manner limitations and the
symbolic speech doctrine of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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typically require that sexually-oriented businesses be located at some
distance from each other and from schools, churches, and residential
neighborhoods. These regulations are permissible under the First
Amendment so long as they serve a substantial governmental interest,
such as preventing neighborhood deterioration, and provide for ample
alternative avenues of communication. 75
The Court's decisions in cases involving special zoning
regulations for sexually-oriented businesses have shaped the
development of the constitutional doctrine applicable to all
regulations of sexually-oriented businesses. The key elements in
determining the constitutional permissibility of such regulations are:
(1) undesirable secondary
effects; and (2) ample alternative avenues
76
of communication.
The Court has given the government broad latitude in finding
undesirable secondary effects to justify a particular regulation, such
as a requirement that female dancers wear "pasties" and "G-strings" 77
or a prohibition against locating more than one sexually oriented
business in the same building. 78 At the same time, in every case in
which the Court upheld a regulation of sexually-oriented
entertainment, it held that the regulation provided ample alternative
avenues of communication and, as in the "pasties" and "G-strings"
cases, that the regulation did not interfere with the message of
sexuality conveyed by the nearly-nude dancers. The point is that
while the government can regulate sexually-oriented entertainment to
advance its asserted interest in preventing undesirable secondary
effects, the First Amendment protects the message of erotica
conveyed by sexually-oriented entertainment and ensures that such
entertainment will continue to take place. 7

75.

See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am.

Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
76. See Young, 427 U.S. 50 (setting forth these elements).
77.

City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277; Barnes, 501 U.S. 560. In the context of undesirable

secondary effects associated with completely nude dancing, the cities asserted an increase in
crime, prostitution, sexual activity, and sexually transmitted diseases. See, e.g., City of Erie, 529

U.S. at 297-98.
78.

City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002). The Court also held that

the city could reasonably rely on a 1977 study showing that a ban on the concentration of
sexually-oriented businesses in a particular neighborhood would reduce crime. Id. at 436.
79.

The subtext of the litigation with regard to the regulation of sexually-oriented
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B. Licensing of the Business of Expression
Any system of governmental licensing of expression analytically

involves a prior restraint, and the Court has dealt with such licensing
by imposing specific requirements. 80 As a general proposition, any

law licensing expression must be content-neutral and must contain
narrow, objective and definite standards that control the discretion of
the licensing official.8 1 If the law fails to contain such standards, it is
invalidated "on its face," and a party subject to the law is not required
to apply for a license as a condition to challenging its

entertainment is the economic impact of the regulation. The owners of businesses featuring
sexually-oriented entertainment are in the "business of expression" to make money, in the same
manner as newspapers or television stations. The goal of the government regulators is to impair
the economic viability of the sexually-oriented businesses in the hope that they will close down.
So, special zoning for sexually-oriented entertainment is likely to attempt to minimize the
desirable locations available for sexually-oriented entertainment.
The government may impose a host of other restrictions that affect the economic viability
of sexually-oriented entertainment, but that do not violate the First Amendment because they do
not interfere with the expression of sexuality. In analyzing restrictions on nude dancing that
have been upheld by lower federal courts and that are consistent with applicable Supreme Court
doctrine, I concluded:
What has emerged from the extensive litigation over governmental regulation of nude
dancing is that the Supreme Court and lower court decisions have effectively separated
the communicative erotic message conveyed by nude dancing from the undesirable
secondary effects associated with the operation of adult entertainment establishments
featuring nude dancing. They have separated this communicative message, protected
by the First Amendment, from the commercial sex industry, of which nude dancing is
a part. The states may not prohibit nude dancing in adult entertainment establishments.
However, they may regulate it extensively in order to combat undesirable secondary
effects. They may require that the dancers wear a minimal amount of clothing,
represented by a 'g-strings' and 'pasties' requirement, but they may not otherwise
prevent the dancers from appearing nude. They may prohibit nude dancing in adult
entertainment establishments that serve alcohol, but must permit nude dancing in adult
entertainment establishments that do not. They may prohibit any sexual contact
between the dancers and their customers and may require that there be a buffer zone
between them, but subject to these restrictions, the dancers must be able to perform
table dances. In the final analysis, the First Amendment protects the core message of
sexuality and eroticism conveyed by nude dancing, and thus advances the underlying
purpose of this fundamental constitutional guarantee.
Robert A. Sedler, Nude Dancing, in PROTECTING FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION: THE FIRST

AMENDMENT AND LAND USE LAW 195, 206 (Daniel R. Mandelker & Rebecca L. Rubin eds.,
2001).
80. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
81. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-59 (1988).
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constitutionality. 82 In addition, the Court has held that the First
Amendment imposes procedural requirements on the operation of
licensing systems, which are designed to ensure that expression will
not be delayed or "chilled" due to the licensing requirement. These
procedural requirements were first imposed by Freedman v.
Maryland,83 in the context of challenges to state systems of motion
picture censorship. The Court held that the following three safeguards
are necessary to ensure expeditious decision-making by the
censorship board: (1) Any restraint can be imposed prior to judicial
review only for a specified brief period of time in which the status
quo must be maintained; (2) Expeditious judicial review of that
decision must be available; and (3) The censor must bear the burden
of going to court to suppress the speech and must bear the burden of
proof once in court. 84
In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,8 5 the Court held that the first
two Freedman requirements applied to a city's licensing of sexuallyoriented businesses, but that the third did not. Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion, which represents the holding of the Court on this
issue, 86 noted that the first two requirements were essential to protect
First Amendment interests in the licensing context "because undue
82. See Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Staub v. City of
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Lovell, 303 U.S. 444. The First Amendment requirements are the
same for parade permits and other laws that in effect require a license for access to public
property.
83. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
84. Id.at 58-59. The Freedman standards apply to customs seizures of allegedly obscene
materials, United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), and to pretrial
seizures of allegedly obscene materials in RICO prosecutions, Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v.
Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (holding that North Carolina's
licensing scheme violated the First Amendment because it required that fundraisers obtain a
license before soliciting but did not require that the licensing official either issue the license
within a specified brief period of time or go to court).
85. 493 U.S. 215,217-18 (1990).
86. This was the position of a three-Justice plurality in an opinion authored by Justice
O'Connor. Three other Justices took the position that all three Freedman requirements should
apply, while three Justices took the position that the Freedman requirements did not apply to
the licensing of sexually-oriented businesses. The O'Connor plurality opinion constitutes the
holding of the Court as the narrowest ground of agreement among the Justices who concurred in
the judgment. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (stating that the narrowest
ground of agreement among the Justices who concurred in the judgment is the holding of a
case).
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delay results in the unconstitutional suppression of protected
speech.", 87 However, the opinion went on to draw a distinction
between a censorship scheme, in which the censor makes judgments
about expressive material, and a licensing scheme, in which the city
only reviews the general qualifications of each applicant and in which
the applicant has every incentive to pursue a license denial with the
courts.88 In any event, as a result of FW/PBS, it is now settled that the
the third, apply to the
first two Freedman requirements, but not
89
licensing of sexually-oriented businesses.
It is clear that the First Amendment provides a high degree of
protection to those engaged in the business of expression when the
state requires that they obtain a license to do so. The licensing law
must be content-neutral and must contain narrow, objective and
definite standards that control the discretion of the licensing
official. 90 In addition, the First Amendment imposes procedural
requirements on the operation of licensing systems, which are
designed to ensure that expression will not be delayed due to the
licensing scheme. In recent years, the licensing of expression has
been, for the most part, directed against sexually-oriented
entertainment businesses, and the operators of these businesses have
been able to use the First Amendment to limit the impact of these
licensing laws.

87. FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 228.

88. Id. at 229-30.
89.

In City ofLittleton v. ZJ. Gifts D-4, Inc., 541 U.S. 774 (2004), the Court held that

when a licensing of sexually-oriented business ordinance had neutral and objective standards,
set forth time limits typically amounting to forty days in which city officials had to make the
licensing decision, and provided that the final decision could be appealed to the state courts in
accordance with the state rules of civil procedure, it was not necessary that the ordinance itself
ensure a "prompt judicial decision." Id. at 780-81. Rather, the Court would assume that the
state's ordinary judicial review procedures, which included provisions for accelerated action,
would avoid delay-induced harm to First Amendment interests. Id. at 782.
In City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278 (2001), the Court indicated

that the requirement of prompt judicial review might not be necessary to protect the First
Amendment rights of a party seeking to renew a license to operate a sexually-oriented business.
Id. at 285-86. Rather, the First Amendment issue in this situation would depend on the
availability of a stay during the process ofjudicial review. Id. at 285.
90. See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
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C. Billboardand Sign Regulation
There have been two cases before the Supreme Court involving
the First Amendment rights of homeowners to display signs in front
of their homes, and in both cases the Court upheld these First
Amendment rights. In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro,9 1 the Court held that a city ordinance that prohibited
"for sale" signs in front of homes violated the First Amendment. The
city's stated purpose for the ordinance was to prevent "white flight"
by homeowners from a racially integrated community. 92 Applying the
commercial speech doctrine, the Court held that the asserted interest
was constitutionally improper because it was based on the content of
the information and proceeded on the premise that the state could
deny individuals access
to truthful information because of how they
93
might make use of it.

In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,94 a city ordinance prohibited
homeowners from displaying any signs on their property, except for
residence identification signs, "for sale" signs, and signs warning of
safety hazards. The ordinance also permitted commercial signs in
commercially or industrially zoned districts. 95 The effect of the
ordinance was to prohibit most signs on a homeowner's property, to
allow some signs, but not others, based on their content, and to treat
96
commercial speech more favorably than non-commercial speech.

91.

431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977).

92. Id. at 88.
93.

Id. at 96-97. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer

Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the seminal case extending First Amendment protection to
commercial speech, the Court held unconstitutional a ban on advertising the prices of
prescription drugs, noting that the state's justification for the ban "rests in large measure on the
advantages of [its citizens] being kept in ignorance." Id. at 769-70. The Court further stated that
"[it is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the
dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us." Id. at
770. The Court repeated this language in Willingboro. 431 U.S. at 97.
The Court in Willingboro indicated that the state could impose reasonable and content
neutral time, place and manner limitations on the use of signs to advance aesthetic interests,
such as regulating the size and number of the signs. Id. at 97-98. Lower federal courts have
upheld some of these restrictions. See, e.g., Am. Legion Post 7 v. City of Durham, 239 F.3d 601
(4th Cir. 2001); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976).
94. 512 U.S. 43, 45 (1994).
95. Id. at 46.
96. Id. at 45-47, 54.
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While the lower court based its decision on the content discrimination
rationale, the Supreme Court went further and held that the city's
near total prohibition of residential signs was unconstitutional. 97 The
effect of the decision was to recognize a homeowner's First
Amendment right to display commercial or non-commercial signs on
his or her property, subject only to the government's ability to98impose
reasonable time, place and manner limitations on the display.
Billboard regulation came before the Court in Metromedia,Inc. v.
City of San Diego,99 in the form of an ordinance that prohibited all
billboards, except for on-site commercial billboards designating the
business' name or advertising its products or services and some noncommercial billboards, such as government signs, religious symbols,
and temporary political campaign signs. The city asserted an interest
in promoting traffic safety by preventing distraction of motorists and
in advancing aesthetics by improving the appearance of the city.100
The Court was highly fragmented, but two holdings emerged from
the decision. First, the Court held that the city could ban all
commercial billboards, and could also distinguish between categories
of commercial speech by making an exception for on-site commercial
billboards.'0 1 Second, the Court held that the ban on billboards was
97. Id. at 54. The Court referred to residential signs as "a venerable means of
communication that is both unique and important." Id. The Court went on to note:
Signs that react to a local happening or express a view on a controversial issue both
reflect and animate change in the life of a community. Often placed on lawns or in
windows, residential signs play an important part in particular campaigns, during
which they are displayed to signal the resident's support for political candidates,
parties, or causes. They may not afford the same opportunities for conveying complex
ideas as do other media, but residential signs have long been an important and distinct
medium of expression.
Id. at 54-55.
98. Cities have tried to limit the display of political signs to a stated period before and to
require removal in a stated period after an election. Lower federal courts and state courts have
consistently held these durational limits on political signs to be violative of the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400 (8th Cir. 1995); Collier v.
City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046 (Wash. 1993).
99. 453 U.S. 490, 490 (1981).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 513. The four-Justice plurality opinion of Justices White, Stewart, Marshall, and
Powell took this position, id at 513, and Justice Stevens agreed with this position as well, id. at
541-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger would have
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unconstitutional as applied to non-commercial speech. 10 2 Four
Justices found this provision unconstitutional because it allowed
commercial billboards in certain locations in which non-commercial
billboards were not, thus favoring commercial speech over noncommercial speech, and because it allowed some non-commercial
billboards, but not others, thereby violating content neutrality.' 0 3 In
addition to the two Justices who found the entire ban
unconstitutional, there were six votes for holding the ban
unconstitutional as applied to non-commercial billboards. 10 4 As a
result of Metromedia, a state can ban all or some commercial
billboards. Left unanswered is the question, unlikely to arise in
practice, of whether a state can ban all billboards, both noncommercial and commercial, with no exceptions.
Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly,' O5 which invalidated location prohibitions and point-of-sale
restrictions on tobacco advertising directed at children, is another
example of the use of the First Amendment as a shield to protect
property rights. 10 6 In Lorillard, the Court invalidated both the
location prohibitions and the point-of-sale restrictions under the
commercial speech doctrine. 10 7 It held that the location prohibitions
were more extensive than necessary to advance the state's interest in
preventing underage tobacco use, and that the on-site advertising
regulation did not directly advance the state's asserted interest in
preventing underage tobacco use and, further, was more restrictive
than necessary to advance this interest. 108 The effect of Lorillardwas
to protect the property interests of tobacco manufacturers and
upheld the ban in its entirety; this holding was therefore supported by seven Justices. Id. at 56970 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
102. Id.at 521.
103. Id. at 513. This was the position of the four-Justice plurality.
104. This was the position of Justices Brennan and Blackmun, who would have found the
ban unconstitutional in its entirety. Id. at 534 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
105. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
106. The First Amendment analysis applied to the ban on smokeless tobacco and cigar
advertising. The Court held that the ban on cigarette advertising was preempted by federal law.
Id. at 550.
107. Id. at 565-66.
108. Id.
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retailers in promoting the sale of tobacco and of billboard owners in
obtaining this source of advertising revenue.
D. Illegal Conduct and the Business of Expression
It would not be expected that the First Amendment would protect
illegal conduct by those engaged in the business of expression, and,
as a general rule, it does not. The rationale here is that what is
regulated is the illegal conduct, and it is irrelevant that such conduct
took place in connection with the business of expression. This being
so, it is unnecessary for the government to justify the prohibition
under a First Amendment analysis. Thus, a nuisance abatement law
providing for the forced closure of a building used for purposes of
"lewdness, assignation, or prostitution" may be applied to force the
closure of a building used as an adult book store, following a finding
that the prohibited activities took place in that building. 0 9 Similarly,
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) °
may be applied to forfeit the assets of an owner of stores and theaters
dealing in sexually explicit materials upon a conviction for selling
obscene materials at several of these stores."'
The First Amendment can be used as a shield in this context
because it precludes the government, in an effort to prevent illegal
conduct, from taking action that would have a chilling effect against
constitutionally-protected expression. The government can avoid this
problem by focusing its action on the illegal conduct and by
separating that conduct from protected expression. Thus, a court can
issue an injunction against the dissemination of material determined
109. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1986). Because it is not necessary
for the government to justify the prohibition under a First Amendment analysis, it is irrelevant
that the closure order may have gone further than was necessary to prevent the illegal conduct.
Id. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals held that the closure order interfered with the
free speech rights of the operator of the bookstore, and, in the absence of a showing that the
closure order was no broader than necessary to prevent the illegal conduct from occurring, the
order violated the free speech provision of the State Constitution. People ex rel Acara v. Cloud
Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 558-59 (N.Y. 1986).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000).
111. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 556-58 (1993). Four Justices (Kennedy,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter) took the position that the First Amendment precluded the
forfeiture of books and movies not determined to be obscene. Id. at 575-76 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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to be obscene in an adversarial proceeding. This is because once there
has been a judicial determination of obscenity, the material is no
longer protected speech and the First Amendment no longer
precludes the issuance of an injunction against its dissemination. 112
Likewise, because sex-designated "help-wanted" ads have been held
to be a form of illegal sex discrimination, the First Amendment does
13
not preclude an injunction against a newspaper carrying such ads.
However, an injunction prohibiting a theater showing obscene films
in the future, based on its past showing of obscene films, is an
unconstitutional prior restraint. 114 Unless and until there has been a
judicial determination that particular films are obscene, the showing
of these films is protected by the First Amendment. 115 An injunction
prohibiting the showing of obscene films in the future could have a
chilling effect on protected expression, in that the theater owner may
be deterred from showing certain sexually explicit films for fear that
they might subsequently be found to be obscene. 116 For the same
reason, a government commission cannot make a list of
"objectionable" books and threaten distributors with possible
obscenity prosecutions if they continue to distribute these books. 117
E. Regulation of Newspapers and Publishers
Newspapers and publishers have successfully used the First
Amendment as a shield to prevent the government from placing
burdens on the operation of their businesses. The Court invalidated,
as violative of the First Amendment, a "right to reply" law, which
required any newspaper that attacked the personal character or
official record of a candidate for public office to provide the8
candidate with equal space in the newspaper to reply to the attack. 1
The Court reasoned that the "right to reply" requirement could have a
112.
113.
(1973).

See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376

114. See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
115.
116.
117.
118.

See id.
See id.
See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974).
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chilling effect on a newspaper's discussion of candidates and public
issues.11 9 The Court also held unconstitutional state efforts to impose
special taxes on newspapers, such as a use tax on the cost of paper
and ink products consumed in the production of a publication, as well
as exemptions limiting the effects of these efforts to only a few
newspapers. 120 The Court further held unconstitutional a state's
imposition of a sales tax on the sale of magazines, with an exemption
only for religious, professional, trade and sports periodicals.' 2 '
Finally, the Court held unconstitutional a state law requiring that the
proceeds from a book written by an accused or convicted criminal
about a crime be used to compensate the victim, on the grounds that
the law did not provide for compensation to the victim from the
criminal's other assets. 22 The effect of this law was to discriminate
against expression in favor of non-expression, and to provide a
123
disincentive to publishers to publish work with a particular content.
F. Regulation of Broadcasting,Cable and the Internet
Broadcasters have been unable to assert the First Amendment as a
shield against governmental regulation because the Supreme Court
has held that governmental regulation of broadcasting can proceed on
the assumption of "public ownership of the airwaves" and that the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) can require that
broadcasters operate "in the public interest."' 124 It was on this basis
that the Court upheld against First Amendment challenge the nowrepealed "fairness doctrine," which required that broadcasters provide
a balanced presentation of viewpoints, allocate a reasonable
percentage of broadcast time for public issues, and allow an
opportunity to respond to a "personal attack" and to present an
editorial endorsement of a political opponent.125 The Court also held

119.
120.

Id.at 257.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591-93

(1983).
121.

Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 233-34 (1987).

122.

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.

105, 116-17, 123 (1991).
123. Id. at 121-23.
124. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
125. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969).

2006]

Property and Speech

that Congress may constitutionally provide that candidates for federal
office have a legally enforceable right to purchase a reasonable
amount of broadcast time.126 Further, the Court held that the FCC
may impose certain limited restrictions on programming that may be
objectionable to children during the time of day when children are
likely to be listening.' 27 Nonetheless, the First Amendment does
apply to governmental regulation of broadcasting, and certain
broadcasting regulations may be violative of the First Amendment,
such as a complete ban on editorializing by public broadcasting
stations that receive grants from the federal government.128 Given
that the FCC is now lessening its control over broadcasting, issues
involving the First Amendment rights of broadcasters are less likely
to arise in the near future.
The advent of cable television and its regulation by the federal
government and by municipalities has given rise to a number of First
Amendment questions that cannot be fit neatly into the doctrines that
the Court has developed to deal with broadcast regulation.
Conventional cablecasting involves placing cable wires under streets
or on municipally-owned utility poles, and municipalities generally
enter into franchise agreements with a particular cable operator,
thereby giving the operator an effective monopoly on conventional
cablecasting within the municipality. These agreements typically
require the cable operator to reserve some channels for public,
educational and governmental access (PEGs).
126. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
127. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
128. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). In CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the television network refused to accept
any public issue advertising. Id. at 98. Parties seeking to purchase such advertising challenged
the ban, and the Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional requirement that the
network accept such advertising. Id. at 130-32. While conceding that the television network
was not a state actor for constitutional purposes, the Democratic National Committee contended
that the First Amendment imposed an obligation on the FCC to make the airwaves open for
such advertising. Id. at 98. The contrary contention was that for the FCC to require the networks
accept such advertising would itself violate the networks' First Amendment rights. Id. at 94-95.
While the Court did not decide the latter issue, it indicated that the First Amendment did not
impose an obligation on the FCC to require broadcasters to accept public issue advertising. Id.
at 119-21. The Court indicated that the networks had a First Amendment right to exercise a
degree of editorial discretion over their programming. Id.
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Congress was concerned about the monopolistic character of
cablecasting in most municipalities, and, in the Cable Television and
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the "1992 Act"
or the "Act"),1 29 required cable operators to devote a portion of their
channels to programs of local broadcasters. A sharply divided Court
upheld the constitutionality of these "must-carry" provisions, over
objections by the cable operators
that such provisions violated their
30
rights.
Amendment
First
Federal law generally prevents cable operators from exercising
any editorial control over the content of leased-access or publicaccess channels. The 1992 Act, however, permitted cable operators to
prohibit the broadcast of material on leased-access and public-access
channels that the operator "reasonably believes describes or depicts
sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive
manner."' 3 1 The Act further provided that, if the cable operator did
not prohibit such material from being broadcast, it must provide a
separate channel for the material, scramble or otherwise block its
presentation, and permit its viewing only upon written request of a
subscriber.132 Congress also imposed these "segregate and block"
requirements on channels primarily dedicated to sexual programming
and required cable operators to honor a subscriber's request to block
any undesired programs. 133
In what turned out to be a clear victory for the cable operators, a
sharply divided Court upheld the Act's provision granting the cable
operators the authority to prohibit sexual programming on leasedaccess and public-access channels, but held that its "segregate and
129. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
130. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). The majority took the position
that it was appropriate in this area for the Court to defer to congressional judgment, so long as
Congress "ha[d] drawn reasonable inferences based upon substantial evidence." Id. at 195. The
majority held that the legislation was narrowly tailored to preserve the benefits of local
broadcast television, to promote widespread dissemination from a multiplicity of sources, and
to promote fair competition. Id. at 189-90, 224-25. The dissenting Justices contended that the
record did not support the conclusion that cable television posed a significant threat to local
broadcast markets or that the law was narrowly tailored to deal with anti-competitive conduct.
Id. at 257-58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
131. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (2000).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 532(h)-(j), app. § 531.
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block" requirements violated the cable operators' First Amendment
rights. 134 In another victory for cable operators, the Court, again
sharply divided, held unconstitutional a federal law requiring that
cable operators who provided channels primarily dedicated to
sexually-oriented programming either completely block these
channels so that non-subscribers would be unable to see or hear them
or, if they could not completely block these channels, that they
operate them only between the hours of 10:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M.,
when children were unlikely to be viewing. 13 5 The Court majority
held that this law was content-based, with a serious impact on
protected speech, and that there was available the less restrictive
alternative of allowing an individual subscriber to request that the
channel be blocked. 136
Congress' efforts to prevent minors from receiving sexuallyoriented material over the internet have foundered on the rock of the
First Amendment. In the Communications Decency Act (CDA),
Congress prohibited transmitting indecent messages to any recipient
under eighteen years of age 137 and knowingly sending or displaying
patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to persons
under eighteen years of age. 138 The Court invalidated both of these
provisions as too vague and too broad to withstand First Amendment
scrutiny. 139 In the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), Congress
prohibited knowingly posting for commercial purposes material
harmful to minors, which was essentially defined as material that was
obscene for minors. 140 In a five-to-four decision, the Court upheld the
grant of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of this law on
the ground that it probably violated the First Amendment because
there were less restrictive alternatives available to protect children,
such as filtering software at the receiving end. 141
134.
135.
136.
137.

Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
Id.
47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2000).

138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. § 223(d).
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
47 U.S.C. § 23 1(a) (2000).
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed the impact of the First Amendment's
free speech guarantee on the use, enjoyment and control of property.
A review of Supreme Court decisions in this area demonstrates that
the impact has been quite significant. The discussion of "The First
Amendment as Sword" has shown that the First Amendment has been
asserted effectively to interfere with a property owner's use or control
of tangible property and to limit the protection of an owner's property
interests. The discussion of "The First Amendment as Shield" has
shown that the First Amendment has been asserted effectively to
invalidate or limit otherwise permissible governmental regulation of
property ownership or use by enterprises engaged in the business of
expression.
The effective assertion of the First Amendment on the one hand as
"sword," and on the other hand as "shield," demonstrates most
cogently the high degree of protection afforded to freedom of
expression by the American constitutional system. With the First
Amendment as "sword," property rights are subordinated to First
Amendment rights; with the First Amendment as "shield," enterprises
engaged in the business of expression can invalidate or limit
otherwise permissible regulation of property ownership or use. This
Article has explained how the strong constitutional protection
afforded to freedom of expression in the American constitutional
system is reflected in the "law of the First Amendment," and has
demonstrated by a review of cases that the application of the "law of
the First Amendment" to questions of property and speech has
continued on the same course during the years of the Rehnquist
Court. During this era, as it has at least since the 1960s, the Court as
an institution has demonstrated a strong commitment to the
constitutional protection of freedom of expression, and this
commitment has been evident in the Court's decisions in the area of
property and speech.

